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Abstract:  This paper uses panel data for Mexico for 1997 to 1999 in order to 
test several assumptions regarding the impact of a conditional cash transfer 
program on child labor, emphasizing the differential impact on indigenous 
households.  Using data from the conditional cash transfer program, PROGRESA 
(OPORTUNIDADES), in Mexico, we investigate the interaction between child 
labor and indigenous households.  While indigenous children had a greater 
probability of working in 1997, this probability is reversed after treatment in the 
program.  Indigenous children also had lower school attainment compared with 
Spanish-speaking or bilingual children.  After the program, school attainment 
among indigenous children increased, reducing the gap. 
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  It is estimated that more than 120 million children around the world between ages 
5 and 14 are working full time and are being paid for their work (Basu 1998).  A vast 
majority of them live in less developed economies.  A variety of policies have been 
recommended to deal with this situation, proposals that range from banning child labor 
through legislation to formalizing the contracts under which children work in order to 
improve their working conditions.  One important question is which policies are 
preferred, and under what specific conditions.  The answer to this question depends on 
the idea of the development process that both the analyst and the policymaker have. 
 
  Understanding the problems of development from an analytical perspective can 
give rise to policies that widen the set of possibilities for those facing adverse economic 
conditions.  Research has focused on the causes of child labor more than on its 
consequences for the households and the economy as a whole.  Several supply and 
demand forces affecting the quantity of child labor in the market have been identified in 
the literature.
1  Among the former are fertility decisions,
2 behavior toward risk in the 
absence of formal markets
3, conditions in the adult labor market,
4 and the incentives for 
the parents to have sources of support during old age.  On the demand side the most 
important factor is the nature of the available technology and its change over time. 
 
  In the first part of the paper we present a static setting with altruistic parents to 
investigate the role of preferences and technology on the decision of parents to send their 
children to school as their income increases.  We contrast a partial equilibrium case with 
a general equilibrium one, finding that the nature of the available technology plays a key 
role in determining the effect on child labor of exogenous increases in parents’ wages and 
productivity.  This is consistent with the empirical literature, as discussed in Grootaert 
and Kanbur (1995). 
 
                                                 
1 Two complementary pieces are Grootaert and Kanbur (1995) on the empirical side of the literature and 
Basu (1998) on the theoretical side. 
2 For example Lloyd (1994), Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977), and a recent example is Kahhat (2001). 
3 For example, Jacoby and Skoufias (1997). 
4 See Basu and Van (1998) and López-Calva (2001).   2 
 
  In the second part of the paper we propose a dynamic overlapping generations 
model with non-altruistic parents.  After describing the environment we impose a social 
norm that requires intergenerational transfers and show that its sustainability is incentive-
compatible across generations.  Those transfers give the dynamic link between 
investment in schooling and future consumption for the parents, who otherwise would 
have no incentive to invest in their children’s schooling.  This dynamic model also allows 
us to characterize the steady-state level of human capital in the economy.  The dynamic 
effects of the existence of child labor are then discussed. After discussing the relevant 
issues for child labor in Latin America, we move on to analyze the effect of the 
conditional cash transfer program, PROGRESA (now OPORTUNIDADES), on child 
labor among indigenous and non-indigenous children in Mexico, using data from the 
evaluation database. 
 
  There have been several attempts to evaluate the impact of PROGRESA in 
several dimensions, though close to nothing has been done in order to test the differential 
impact of the program on indigenous versus non-indigenous people (for a summary, see 
IFPRI 2000).  Perhaps the only attempt in this respect is Parker et al. (2003), which 
provides an empirical estimation of the impact of language barriers in determining school 
achievement and the potential ameliorating role of bilingual education.  By using large 
household data sets from PROGRESA, the authors find that, controlling for family 
resources and school quality, language represents an important barrier for indigenous 
schoolchildren.  In particular, it is shown that there is a large gap in the educational 
performance of monolingual indigenous children relative to bilingual indigenous children 
and that bilingual primary schools narrow this gap.  The results in the latter paper are 
rather consistent with our findings below. 
 
2.  Child Labor and Indigenous Peoples in Latin America 
 
  The indigenous peoples of Latin America live in extreme poverty.  There are over 
40 million indigenous peoples in Latin America, or about 8 percent of the region’s 
population.  Mexico has the largest indigenous population in the Americas, at over 12 
million, or about 13 percent of total population.  Access to formal education in Mexico   3 
 
has expanded in recent years, and improvements have occurred in indigenous areas.   
Nevertheless, educational levels remain higher in non-indigenous areas.  In 2002, 12.8 
percent of children between 6 and 14 years living in indigenous municipalities did not 
enroll in school and 32.5 percent of individuals older than 15 years did not know how to 
read or write (Instituto Nacional Indigenista 2002). 
 
  According to Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (1994), the child labor force is greater 
in indigenous areas than in non-indigenous areas.  This can be partially explained by the 
rural concentration of the indigenous population.  The impact of parental education is 
greatest in less indigenous municipalities.  The household head employment conditions 
have a clear impact on a child’s average educational attainment.  Heads of household 
who work in non-agricultural pursuits, in either indigenous or non-indigenous areas, have 
children with higher levels of educational attainment than otherwise employed heads of 
household.  The contribution of the income of working children to total family income is 
substantial. 
 
  As expected, the contribution of child labor to family income increases with age, 
while increasing educational attainment reduces the contribution.  Child income plays a 
slightly greater role in total family income in indigenous areas than in non-indigenous 
areas.  Also, indigenous children are expected to have a higher likelihood of being 
employed and not in school because of language problems, school access (distance) and 
“cultural” differences.  Guarcello, Mealli and Rosati (2003) show that indigenous 
households have a lower school attendance and higher work participation rate than the 
rest of the population. 
 
  In the academic literature, the phenomenon of child labor is often analyzed in 
conjunction with mothers’ fertility, especially for rural areas.  Within the framework of 
fertility determinants and the economic value of children, it is hypothesized that children 
are economic assets of rural families in developing countries.  These models are 
developed from the general household production theory.  According to the quantity-
quality trade-off for children hypothesis, the household demand for child quality, as   4 
 
measured by household investment in children’s schooling, is expected to have a negative 
effect on its demand for child quantity. 
 
  An important distinction is made between child work for wages (or family 
enterprise work) and household work.  Most children work in the sense that they help 
around the house and assist their parents.  These activities help prepare the child for adult 
life and have many positive benefits.  Child labor, however, implies something very 
different, including exploitation, overwork and deprivation of health, education and even 
childhood.  This problem is made worse when working children are too young or put in 
very long hours.  Ilahi, Orazem and Sedlacek (2000) explore the relationship between 
child labor and future adult earnings and poverty status.  They find that indigenous 
individuals have a smaller future wage, less income, and are more likely to fall into 
poverty. 
 
  In a simple household production model, the supply of child labor is a function of 
the economic and demographic characteristics of the household, age and sex of the 
children, and the costs and returns of alternatives time uses of children.  It is 
hypothesized that individual child characteristics such as age, sex and birth order will be 
important determinants of child labor.  For example, the older the child is, the greater the 
probability of being employed.  Also, indigenous children are expected to have a higher 
likelihood of being employed.  Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) find that there are 
some gender-based distinctions in the type of tasks performed by a girl and a boy worker; 
girls do more household chores, while boys are in the labor force. 
 
  Family characteristics have an important role to play in a child’s decision to 
attend class or work.  Father’s education has a significant negative effect on child labor; 
the effect is stronger for girls than for boys.  Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997) also 
find that the number of siblings not enrolled in school proves to be an important control 
variable in at least one specification of the empirical model.  They also find that child 
labor is not always detrimental to school attendance.  Besides, they find that rural 
residence and being indigenous both have a negative impact on age-grade distortion.     5 
 
However, the largest factor determining age-grade distortion for indigenous children is 
employment.  Indigenous children who work are much more likely to be older than the 
usual schooling age.  Being indigenous and rural residence both have a large impact on 
the likelihood that the student also works.  Their analysis shows that family size is 
important.  To increase schooling attainment and performance of rural, poor and/or 
indigenous children, appropriate targeting mechanisms must be designed.  Child labor is 
not affected by adult unemployment but it responds to adult wages.  Higher social 
acceptance of child labor reduces the stigma and increases child labor (Freije and Lopez-
Calva 2000). 
 
  Household factors are expected to exert considerable impact on child labor and 
school enrollment rates.  Poorer families probably have more children because of a need 
for child labor and/or lack of out-of-school human capital investments.  The composition 
of income is also a factor, as families in self-employment are more likely to utilize family 
labor.  Since poverty is correlated with low schooling levels, in poor households parents 
cannot be expected to either provide their children with any meaningful assistance with 
their school work and/or provide a good home learning environment, thus contributing to 
child labor.  Poorer families probably also are more likely to take their children out of 
school in times of need and then allow them to re-enroll. 
 
  Children of indigenous groups are less likely to work full-time or to work for 
wages compared to children of other groups (Patrinos and Grootaert 1999).  They find 
that indigenous children are probably excluded from formal sector employment, just like 
their parents.  Throughout Latin America children of indigenous groups are more than 
twice as likely to be working as other children.  Children whose mothers are not in the 
labor force are more likely to work if they are indigenous.  This makes indigenous 
children prime candidates for targeted programs to increase school attendance and 
decrease child labor.  There must be an economic change in the condition of a struggling 
family to free a child from the responsibility of working.  Subsidies can help provide this 
change.  Poor families are able to recognize good quality schooling and are frequently 
prepared to sacrifice child labor in order to invest in a good education for their children.    6 
 
School represents the most important means of drawing children away from the labor 
market.  The question is, do incentive programs such as PROGRESA/ 
OPORTUNIDADES impact the indigenous population – at all, or the same as non-
indigenous children, or more?  Do incentive programs reduce child labor – and is there a 
differential impact for indigenous children? 
 
3.  Simple Theoretical Models 
3.1 Static  Analysis 
  Most of the previous literature on child labor includes static models in which 
parents are altruistic in the sense that they care about either their children’s leisure or 
their children’s schooling as such (Rosenzweig and Evenson 1977; Goldin 1989; Basu 
and Van 1998).
5  The introduction of some children’s measure of welfare in the utility 
function of the parents seems difficult to avoid in a static setting, but can be relaxed in a 
dynamic setting with purely self-interested parents, as we shall show in this paper. 
 
  The first model we present follows the lines of the previous literature and aims at 
analyzing the effect of an increase in the wages of adults – via technological change – on 
children’s labor force participation.  We first see the effect in a partial equilibrium 
environment, when the household takes the wages as given.  As a second step, we 
introduce a simple general equilibrium framework.  The nature of the available 
technology turns out to play a very important role in determining the effects on child 
labor supply because of the substitution possibilities between child and adult labor on the 
production side, considering their relative productivities. 
 
  As has been mentioned above, we assume the “unitary model” of the household in 
the sense that the head of the household is the decision maker.
6  The preferences we 
assume are similar to those presented in Rosenzweig and Evenson (1997).  They include 
an index of the standard of living of the household (per capita consumption) and the 
                                                 
5 Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) present a dynamic model but it also includes human capital as a bequest that 
implies a higher utility for the parents. 
6 A discussion regarding the strengths and weaknesses of this assumption can be found in Grootaert and 
Kanbur (1995) and Basu (1998), inter alia.   7 
 
leisure and hours of schooling of the children.  We introduce the leisure of the decision 
maker, instead of the leisure of the children, in order to evaluate the effect of higher adult 
wages on labor force participation with heads of the household that are not purely 
altruistic, but selfish, in the sense that they value their own free time.  The assumption of 
inelastic supply of labor by parents, which is made in other models for the sake of 
simplicity, implies a higher degree of altruism, as the parents always prefer to work and 
would never substitute their own labor with their children’s.  The utility function of the 
representative household in this model is, therefore: 
) , , ( s l c U U =  
where c is an index of the welfare within the household – per capita consumption, l is the 
leisure of the household head, and s is the time the children attend school.  We assume 
that 0 > i U , 0 < ii U ,  i=1,2,3 and U is strictly concave.  Children and parents are 
endowed with one unit of time and we assume that each household has one child.
7  There 
are m households.  The problem of the representative household is as follows: 
Max   ) , , ( s l c U  (1) 
s.t. 
I I a A L w L w c + ≤  
1 = + s LI  (2) 
1 = +l La  
where  a L  and  I L  are the supply of labor of adults and children, and  A w  and  I w  their 
respective wages.  Let us make the following assumption: 
Al.  j i Uij , , 0 > =1,2,3;  j i ≠ . 
 
  The assumption only tells us that there is a certain degree of complementarity 
among goods in the preferences of the parents. In this partial equilibrium setting we get 
the following result. 








                                                 
7 The introduction of the number of children would become more interesting in the dynamic setting, 
especially if we want to analyze fertility decisions.   8 
 
Result 1: A sufficient condition for the non-exploitative scenario to arise is the 
following: 
sl sc A U U w >  
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
  This result tells us that the non-exploitative scenario can hold with reasonable 
assumptions on preferences; as long as hours of schooling are a better complement of 
consumption than of leisure, the result is obtained.
8  If that is the case, as the wage 
increases, parents would increase the level of schooling instead of consuming more 
leisure.  If this is the case, then we should expect that the transfers from 
PROGRESA/OPORTUNIDADES would imply a reduction in child labor. 
 
  In a general equilibrium setting we have to incorporate the decision of the firms 
and the condition under which the markets clear.  The representative firm in the economy 
has a technology that allows for substitution between adult and child labor, which we 
consider, by simplicity, as the only factors of production.  There are two productivity 
shifters for each type of labor, α  for adults and γ  for children.  The equivalence factor 
between adult and child labor is thus given by
α
γ
.  We denote the amount of efficiency 
units of child labor used in production as I
~
 and the amount of efficiency units of adult 
labor by A
~
.  The problem of the firm is: 









 represents the adult’s labor in efficiency units ( ) A α and  I
~
 has the same 
interpretation for children() I γ .  Let us suppose first that the head of the household solves 
                                                 
8  In the case of Basu and Van (1998) there is a discreet jump in the marginal utility from hours of 
schooling as per capita consumption reaches the subsistence level, inducing a more than proportional jump 
in schooling at that point.  Given that parents do not value their own leisure, the condition also holds 
trivially.   9 
 
the problem presented above taking wages as given, without considering the problem of 
the firms. 
Definition: An equilibrium for this economy as a set ( )
* * * * * * * , , , , , , I A I a w w I A L L c  such that  
1. 
* * * , , I a L L c solve the household problem; 
2. 





I w  clear the adult and child labor markets, respectively (i.e., 
*
a w  and 
*
I w  are 
such that  () () [ ] . 1 .
* * s m I − =  and × () () . .
* * A La =
9 
 
  We can now analyze what the effect of a change in the productivity shifter 
α would be in a general equilibrium setting.  This can be seen as technological change 
that makes adult labor more productive in the production process and increases the wage 
that adults earn in that market. 
 
Result 2: The effect of an increase in the adult wage via technological change will be 
ambiguous, depending on the nature of the available technology and preferences.  Let us 
assume, for example, the technology 
I A I A F Y γ α + = = ) , (  







to hold is  
cl cc U U >  
 
  In their review of the available empirical evidence, Grootaert and Kanbur (1995) 
conclude that “today’s technology can have ambivalent effects on the demand of child 
work.”  As can be seen in the Appendix, the conditions that have to be imposed on 
technology in a general form to obtain an unambiguous result would not have an 
economically meaningful interpretation.  The most interesting thing to notice is that we 
cannot get an unambiguous result without specifying the technological conditions in the 
economy, specifically conditions related to the degree of complementary between the two 
                                                 
9 The other market, the consumption good market, can be left out invoking Walras’ Law, and the price can 
be normalized to 1.   10 
 
types of labor.  The reason is that as productivity of adults increase (a positive change in 
α ) the demand for child labor would also change, changing the wages of the children 
and thus potentially inducing a different level of child labor in the economy.  In the 
specific example shown above we are restricting the technology so that there is no 
complementary between inputs.
10  Given this technology, the preferences of the parents 
interact with the nature of the technology in such a way that a simple restriction on 
preferences (similar to the one described above) would give us the result.
11  The result 
obtained in Basu and Van (1998) is consistent with ours, for the condition on preferences 
holds trivially in the case in which parents do not value leisure.  The nature of unskilled 
labor markets in the Mexican rural setting allows us to test for this effect using the 
PROGRESA/OPORTUNIDADES database. 
 
  The nature of the available technology is thus a key determinant of child labor 
force participation in this simple static setting.  Actually, it plays an even more important 
role than preferences of the parents, which under mild conditions would result in 
reduction of child labor as adult wages increase, even for parents who value their own 
leisure.  Let us analyze in the following section whether this result holds in a dynamic 
setting. 
 
3.2  Dynamic Setting with Purely Self-interested Parents 
  The existence of child labor has dynamic economic implications, like those in 
terms of human capital investment and the evolution of aggregate human capital, with an 
effect on the growth possibilities for the economy as a whole.  We follow the unitary 
model of the household. Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) used a dynamic setting, as they were 
interested in analyzing the use of children as a pool of assets as a consumption smoothing 
device in the absence of perfect credit and insurance markets.  In that model it is assumed 
that parents care about the schooling of their children as such, in the form of a bequest of 
                                                 
10  Despite the fact that we can find economically meaningful ways to argue in favor of complementary 
(adults as supervisors or managers, for example), it does not seem to be extremely restrictive to think of 
productivity corrected perfect substitution between adult and child labor. 
11 We use this example because it is the type of aggregation used in Basu and Van (1998).   11 
 
human capital investment that enters the utility function of the head of the household.
12   
The same assumption is made in all the static models, plugging hours of schooling of the 
children as an argument of the utility function of the parent.
13  Although in the static 
model this seems difficult to avoid, we eliminate those variables from the utility function 
in the dynamic setting.  We set up a model in which parents are purely self-interested, as 
an extreme case, to analyze how much the results obtained in other models can be 
supported in this non-altruistic framework. 
 
  A dynamic setting gives us the right environment to work under those conditions.  
The only extra requirement is the existence of intergenerational transfers, which we 
impose as a social norm that can be sustained as an equilibrium.  In this framework, 
parents will care about human capital investment as long as a higher level of human 
capital investment will affect their children’s future income possibilities and thus their 
own economic well-being when they retire. 
 
  Let us assume an overlapping generations model with production.  Individuals 
live three periods.  A person born in t (t=1,2,…n,…) takes the hours of schooling and 
level of consumption during childhood as given (i.e., as chosen by his parent).  The time 
the child spends out of school (1-s) is spent supplying labor in the child labor market.  
The money earned is collected by the head of the household, who is the only decision 
maker, as we want to be consistent with the unitary model of the household.  When adult, 
the individual gives birth to a child and will supply inelastically the time endowment 
available to her.  The adult here has to choose the level of consumption within the 
household, which implies choosing the hours of schooling of her child.  The only 
arguments of the parent’s utility function are her own consumption, during adulthood and 
old age.  During the third period the agent retires and her capacity to generate income 
disappears.  The old agent thus has to rely on a transfer of consumption units from her 
adult offspring.  Therefore, during adulthood the agent decides on consumption for her 
child, own consumption and her retired parent’s consumption.  These decisions are made 
                                                 
12 Strictly speaking they call it “final level of human capital” in the last period. 
13 Even in dynamic models like Glomm (1997), hours of schooling are introduced as an argument in the 
utility function of the parents. See also López-Calva and Rivas (2003).   12 
 
for a given set of prices , At w   It w .  There is neither population growth nor bequests. 
Individuals are identical in terms of preferences. 
 
  Every model consists of an environment and a set of institutions.  In our model, 
we add the existence of a social norm to the environment already described.  The norm 
says: ”share a third of your income with your offspring during childhood, and a third 
with your retired deserving parent.”  Under this social norm, adults will choose t c , which 
will be interpreted in what follows as per capita consumption within the household.  The 
incentive compatibility of this social norm will be discussed below and we will prove that 
it can be sustained as an equilibrium in the inter-generational interaction game. 
 
  The representative adult problem is as follows: 
) , ( 1 + ℜ ∈ + t t c c c U Max
t  
s.t. 
( ) [ ] . 2 , 1 , 3 / 1 = − + ≤ t s w w c t it at t  
t t ks h = +1  
0 , 1 ≥ + t t c c 
 Where () . U  is the utility function representing the adult’s preferences and 
0 > i U , 0 < ii U ,  U i , 2 , 1 =  is  2 C  and time separable. 
  As in the original model by Diamond (1965), production is assumed to be carried 
out by perfectly competitive firms, which maximize profits every period, taking prices as 
given.  The two inputs that are used in production are adult labor, measured in units of 
human capital (H) and child labor (I).  The technology exhibits constant returns to scale.  
Given these conditions, we can sum up all firms and analyze only aggregate output, as a 
function of the aggregate amount of the inputs used in production: 
( ) t t t I H F Y , =  
  Human capital accumulated during childhood is sold by the adults in the labor 
market.  In this way, the intertemporal trade-off for parents is established: higher   13 
 
consumption today can be achieved only by sending the child to work more hours, which 
restricts his human capital available during the second period and thus reduces the 
consumption of the retired parent.  The individual and aggregate states have to be 
consistent and this consistency rule establishes the evolution of aggregate human capital: 
t t t mka mh H = = + + 1 1  
where m is the number of households in the economy, and k is a constant that we can 
interpret as the “quality” of schooling.  The production function satisfies the Inada 
conditions.
14 
Definition: A competitive equilibrium for the economy is a sequence ( )
* * * * , , , , it at t t t w w I A c , 
such that for all t: 
1. The representative adult problem is solved 
2. The problem of the individual firms is solved 
3. Child labor market clears:  ) 1 ( t t s m I − =  
4. Adult labor market clears,  t t mh H =  
Profit maximizing behavior on the production side implies: 
() . 1 F wAt =  
() . 2 F wIt =  
  By plugging the constraints in the production function, making hours of schooling 
() t a  the choice variable, we transform the representative adult problem into: 
[] ( ) [] () , 3 / 1 1 1 , 0 t It t At S s w ks w U Max
t − + − ∈   ( ) [ ] ( ) 3 / 1 1 1 1 + + + − + t It t At s w ks w  
                                                 
14 These are 







t H t H
 







t I t I
   14 
 















  This result tells us that the ratio of marginal utilities from consumption in the two 
periods has to be equal to the ratio of the price of extra consumption tomorrow (that is, 
the child wage you lose by sending him to school one more hour) divided by the price of 
current consumption (represented by the loss on tomorrow’s adult wage by investing one 
less unit in human capital today). 
  This is a result with a very clear economic interpretation and interesting 
implications.  Suppose we added a transfer to household income – some subsidy from the 
government, for example, that gives the possibility of higher consumption.  In this simple 
framework we can see that under our assumptions in terms of the concavity of the utility 
and production functions, as well as the fact that parents do not value leisure, if the 
transfer is announced to be distributed during retirement, it should induce an increase in 
child labor supply in the economy.  This is so because the adults would convert future 
consumption into current consumption, given the possibilities of exogenously-determined 
higher consumption when they are older.  This result hinges on the non-existence of other 
mechanisms of consumption smoothing.  A program of transfers like the one analyzed 
here took place in Bolivia with the so-called “Solidarity Bond” (Bono de solidaridad) 
that the government announced to distribute the benefits from privatization to poor 
retirees.  Current transfers, however, would have the effect of a reduction in child labor. 
  In order to be able to analyze the schooling decisions in this framework, as well as 
the dynamics of human capital, we will assume specific functional forms.  As a first 
example, we will assume a logarithmic utility function of the form: 
1 ln ln + + = t t c c U β         ( 4 )    15 
 
where β  is the discount factor.  We will assume a simple production function, where the 
inputs for production are both human capital, H, and “unskilled” or child labor, I, whose 
marginal productivities are α and η, respectively.
15  The production function is: 
t t t I H Y η α + =        ( 5 )  
  If we combine the conditions from our definition of equilibrium we obtain a 






2 = − + + + − − + η η βα β α β ηα η k s k s k s t t t  (6) 
  Result 3: Let us denote the steady state level of schooling by  0
* ≠ s and for  1 > η , 
if  η βα > k , the steady state level of schooling is positive. 
  Proof: See Appendix. 
  The result is economically meaningful.  Parents will always invest in schooling if 
the benefit from doing so – the discounted value of the extra unit of future consumption 
obtained by an extra unit of human capital – is greater than the cost of schooling, which is 
the unit of foregone current consumption.  Assuming this condition holds, we can see, by 
doing simple comparative statics, what the effect of an increase in the adult’s wage would 
be on schooling. 















2 3 > −  
  As shown in López-Calva (2003), the nature of the markets and the characteristics 
of the population in rural settings, such as the PROGRESA/OPORTUNIDADES 
communities in Mexico, makes the “informal retirement” scheme a reasonable 
assumption.  That would be especially the case for indigenous groups. 
                                                 
15 The general form is  [] ρ ρ ρ η α
1
I H Y + =    16 
 
 
4. Methodology  
  The initial logit/probit econometric approach to study child labor and school 
attendance to estimate the probability of an indigenous child going to school or/and work 
misses the relationship between the school and work decisions.  The school and labor 
supply independence assumption is untenable.  Therefore, more recent approaches deal 
with the interrelated nature of these events (see Freije and Lopez-Calva 2000). 
 
  We use two econometric models for dealing with the work/school multiple choice 
problem: multinomial logit and sequential probit.  These multinomial logit and sequential 
probits have been used in a comparative study (Grootaert and Patrinos 1999). 
 
  The multinomial logit model assumes that the household assumes that it faces a 
single decision process choosing among a set of options.  A sequential probit assumes 
that a household makes choices among the options in a sequential manner (see Freije and 
Lopez-Calva 2000 for further details).  We also use the two models in order to check 
whether the results are robust to different estimation techniques.  It should be highlighted 
that the estimated parameters of these models are not directly comparable.  They refer to 
either conditional probabilities, to marginal probabilities, or to joint probabilities.  We 
refer to the direction and significance of the effect and compare whether the direction of 
the effect, not its size, is the same across models. 
 
  The control variables sitting in Xi,k are the same in the two models and can be 
classified into four groups.  The first group consists of children’s individual 
characteristics, the second includes characteristics of the head of the household and the 
third contains household characteristics.  The fourth group of independent variables is of 
special importance because by testing its significance we test the validity of the 
hypothesis listed in the introduction.  These variables are a set of three dummy variables 
for individuals that only speak an indigenous language, those that are bilingual, and those 
that only speak Spanish.  The direction of the effect is a direct test of differences among 
indigenous and non-indigenous households.   17 
 
 
  We take advantage of the availability of panel data for these households and make 
a comparison between 1997 (before the program started) and 2000.  For the sequential 
probit regressions we take three dependent dichotomous variables: first, it takes value 1 if 
the child goes to school and does not work; second, it takes value 1 if the child goes to 
school and works; and third, if the child does not go to school and works.  We omit the 
case where the child does not go to school and does not work.  We also run a multinomial 
logit equation for three cases of interest compared to a child that goes to school and does 
not work: the probability that the child goes to school and works, does not go to school 
and works, and does not go to school and does not work.  Finally, we take several poverty 
and inequality measures among indigenous, bilingual and Spanish-speaking households 
for both years.  For a better examination of the depth and severity of poverty in 
indigenous, bilingual and Spanish groups, the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke index is used. 
 
5. Data  Description 
  The data used here are the PROGRESA/OPORTUNIDADES survey instruments 
that ask the question whether the person speaks an indigenous language.  They also 
include information on earnings, household structure, school, work and social transfers.  
Examination of this data set gives valuable policy information on whether or not 
government programs are useful for decreasing inequality, particularly by pulling up the 
lower tail of the distribution, where indigenous people largely reside.  PROGRESA/ 
OPORTUNIDADES in Mexico is one of the most comprehensive demand-side financing 
(or conditional cash transfer) programs in the world.  The program provides cash stipends 
to poor families in exchange for ensuring their children’s school attendance.  Parker and 
Skoufias (2001) indicate that PROGRESA has led to significant improvements in 
educational indicators and outcomes.  In fact, the program has led to higher school 
attendance rates and lower school dropout and repetition rates.  There is also evidence of 
reduced child labor.  PROGRESA has nearly eliminated the school enrollment gap 
between rich and poor.  Finally, PROGRESA is very cost-effective. PROGRESA, 
therefore, has the effect of increasing the income of poor households, which are largely 
indigenous in Mexico, especially in rural areas and the poor southern states.  The   18 
 
excellent evaluations of PROGRESA have thus far not focused on the differential impact 
on indigenous peoples.  Therefore, the objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of 
PROGRESA/OPORTUNIDADES on indigenous children’s progress in school and work 
activities.  The determinants of schooling and work will be modeled according to 
Grootaert and Patrinos (1999). 
 
  We use the ENCASEH97, ENCEL99N and ENCEL00N household surveys.
16  
These surveys are part of a round of surveys to evaluate PROGRESA.
17  It consists of a 
base survey and six consecutive surveys of the same household in a three-year period.  
This panel data is representative of the rural disadvantaged populations with 20 to 2,500 
individuals in 7 states.  It includes approximately 138,000 individuals in 26,000 
households in 506 localities, with 320 as the treatment group and 186 as the control 
group.  It includes micro-data on household characteristics, especially those that refer to 
education and health.  It includes demographic characteristics of the household, with 
individual information for all family members. 
 
  In both years, population is separated into three groups: indigenous, Spanish and 
bilingual.  Indigenous is defined as people that only speak an indigenous language but not 
Spanish.  Bilingual is defined as the people that speak both an indigenous language and 
Spanish.  Finally, Spanish stands for people that only speak Spanish but not an 
indigenous language.  Children are defined as individuals between 8 and 16 years. 
 
  For the description of changes in incidence before and after the program, the 
groups are also divided into control and treatment groups.  As explained in Behrman and 
Todd (1999), the process by which the treatment and control samples were collected is as 
follows.  First, a subset of localities in Mexico was chosen to participate in the 
experiment.  Randomization is being implemented at the locality rather than at the 
household level because PROGRESA benefits such as improvements in local schools and 
                                                 
16 ENCEL00N: Encuesta de Evaluación de los Hogares, November 2000; ENCEL99N: Encuesta de 
Evaluación de los Hogares,  November 1999; ENCASEH97: Encuesta de Características Socioeconómicas 
de los Hogares, November 1997. 
17 Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (http://www.progresa.gob.mx/).   19 
 
health facilities are at locality, and therefore would be difficult to have both treatment and 
control groups in the same small locality.  In selecting localities, the probability of being 
chosen is population weighted.  This means that the PROGRESA household data 
subsamples are self-weighting.  Since PROGRESA is targeted primarily at poor families, 
criteria for selection into the experiment are based on empirical measures of poverty 
within the locality.  After selecting a subset of localities to participate in the evaluation, it 
was determined using poverty-related criteria, which households within each locality 
would be eligible to receive PROGRESA services.  Finally, each locality is randomly 
assigned to be a member of either the treatment or control group.  In localities assigned to 
treatment, all eligible households within the locality are offered and usually take 
advantage of PROGRESA benefits/services.  In localities assigned to the control group, 
none of the households receive PROGRESA benefits/services.  There was a 60 percent 
probability of being assigned to treatment and a 40 percent probability of being assigned 
to the control group; 320 localities ended up being assigned to the treatment group and 
185 to the control group. 
 
6. Descriptive  Statistics 
  Child labor is higher among indigenous-monolingual populations.
18  Child labor 
incidence decreased from 16.3 percent to 7.4 percent between 1997 and 1999 (see Table 
1).  An overall decrease is noticed, which is higher among indigenous-monolingual 
children, while Spanish-monolingual children’s labor supply decreased 8.2 percent, it 
decreased 8.9 percent among indigenous-monolingual children.  As children grow older, 
child labor increases.  The steepest change occurs in 1997 in the indigenous-monolingual 
group from 13 to 14 years with a 13.3 percent increase (see Table 2 and Figure 1).  In 
1997, indigenous-monolingual children have higher child labor incidence in all age 
groups except 16.  Bilingual children have the lowest child labor incidence in all groups 
in 1997.  The indigenous-monolingual group has a higher incidence for children between 
8 and 12 years.  An increasing child labor with age pattern is still noticed when we 
separate children in the treatment and control groups (see Table 3). 
                                                 
18 An “indigenous-monolingual population” is a location where more than 30 percent of households report 
a household head that is indigenous-monolingual.   20 
 
 
  All groups had an overall decrease in child labor incidence.  The higher effect was 
noticed in the 13 to 16 year age group Spanish monolingual treatment group with a 18.2 
percent decrease in child labor incidence followed by a 15.7 percent decrease in the 
indigenous monolingual treatment group.  For bilingual children the biggest decrease was 
8.4 percent in the 13 to 16 year old treatment group.  Child labor decreased for all groups 
comparing 1997 to 1999.  It can be noticed that in all three groups child labor incidence 
decreased and differences between the treatment and control group narrowed. 
 
  Education is very similar for bilingual and Spanish-monolingual children at all 
ages.  Bilingual and Spanish-monolingual children have a higher education level with 
respect to indigenous-monolingual children (see Table 4 and Figures 2 and 3).  The 
biggest difference in years of education from 1997 to 1999 was for the 8 to 12 year-old 
indigenous-monolingual children.  The differences in education between 1997 and 1999 
increased with years in the 13 to 16 year old children group.  There is an increase in 
education of 0.3 years for the 8 to 12 year-old children in the bilingual group and 0.8 for 
the indigenous-monolingual group. 
 
 
7. Econometric  Results 
7.1  Differences in Child Labor between Indigenous and Non-indigenous 
Households 
  After estimating the regressions with the panel data, we do not find important 
differences in the predictive ability of the two models.  The percentage of correct 
predictions in the multinomial logit is significantly above 85 percent.  Comparing the 
different results allows us to check the robustness of the results to these assumptions.  
The same pattern of measures of fit was found for the data. 
 
  The results from the probit models are presented in Tables 5, 6 and 7 for the 
indigenous, bilingual and Spanish-speaking households for 1997, while those for 2000 
are presented in Tables 8, 9 and 10.  The results from the multinomial logit for 1997 are 
presented in Tables 11, 12 and 13 for the indigenous, bilingual and Spanish households,   21 
 
while those for 2000 are in Tables 14 through 16.  These results are expressed in terms of 
probabilities compared to a comparison group.  In this paper, the comparison group is 
children that go to school and do not work.  Therefore, all coefficients should be 
interpreted as such.  A negative coefficient should be interpreted as a decreased 
probability of a child’s working compared to a child that goes to school and does not 
work. 
 
  Age, gender and being indigenous do have a significant effect on schooling and 
work decisions in every model.  Older children are more likely to work and not attend 
school.  Older children are also more likely to be in the not working and not going to 
school state. Girls are less likely to go both to school and work.  However, it must also be 
said that girls are also more likely to stay in the no-school/no-work state than to go to 
school only as shown by the negative coefficient for gender both in the sequential model, 
the first two negative coefficients in the multinomial logit model and the positive third 
coefficient in the multinomial logit model.  This evidence supports the findings of 
Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) that state that girls do more household chores. 
 
  Among the characteristics of the household head, a more educated head increases 
the probability of a child going to school and decreases the probabilities of working, as 
shown by the first coefficient of the sequential probit model.  A more educated head 
decreases the probability of a child to go to school and work, or not to go to school and 
work, or not to go to school and not working, compared to children that go to school and 
do not work, as shown by the multinomial logit model.  A married or living in free union 
head increases the probability of a child to go to school and not work, as shown by the 
sequential probit model. 
 
  Household composition is another variable that shows significance in some cases. 
Interestingly, an increase in the number of children under the age of 12 decreases the 
probability of going to school and increases the probability of working in 1997.  This 
evidence support the quality-quantity tradeoff for children hypothesis.  The number of 
children between the ages of 12 and 16 years is not significant in most of the cases.  The   22 
 
effect of the number of adults and elderly (above 60) varies among models, but an 
increase in the number of adults decreases the probability of both going to school and 
working. 
 
  The sign of the coefficients for the sequential probit change from 1997 to 2000 
favoring the school and not working state among the poor.  This supports the idea that 
parents will invest in schooling if the benefit from doing so is greater than the cost of 
schooling.  Finally in the multinomial logit model poverty is not a significant factor 
compared to children that go to school and work.  While in 1997 it decreases the 
probability to go to school and not to work, to go to school and to work, and not go to 
school and work, in 2000 it increases the probability to go to school and not to work and 
becomes insignificant for the other two states. 
 
  In 1997 indigenous children had a lower probability of going to school and a 
higher probability of working.  This evidence supports the Guarcello, Mealli an Rosati 
(2003) hypothesis and Patrinos and Grootaert (1999) findings.  It can be noticed that by 
2000 these effects were reversed by the program (PROGRESA). As a result, by 2000 an 
indigenous child has an increased probability of going to school and a decreased 
probability of working, consistent with the non-exploitative scenario in the theoretical 
models above. 
 
  In the 1997 sequential probit model, an indigenous child has a lower probability 
of going to school and working, going to school and working and not going to school and 
working.  By 2000, an indigenous child had a higher probability of going to school and 
working and a lower probability of not going to school and working.  Recall that in the 
multinomial logit model all coefficients are probabilities with respect to the comparison 
group of children that go to school and do not work.  In this model for 1997 an 
indigenous child has a higher probability of going to school and working relative to the 
comparison group, while in 2000 this coefficient becomes insignificant and, therefore, 
being an indigenous child is not a determinant for this condition.  In this model for 1997 
an indigenous child has no significant effect on either not going to school and working,   23 
 
and not going to school and not working, compared to the comparison group.  In 2000 
being an indigenous child decreases the probability of not going to school and working. 
 
  Work and schooling probabilities do not change as significantly or greatly for 
bilingual children as they do for indigenous children.  In the sequential probit model, 
there were no changes for the probabilities of going to school and working or not.  But a 
bilingual child had a higher probability of not going to school and working in 1997 while 
it has a lower probability in 2000.  In the multinomial logit model there were no changes 
for the probabilities of not going to school, but a bilingual child has a lower probability of 
going to school and working in 1997, while this coefficient becomes insignificant in 
2000. 
 
  Spanish speaking children did not experience changes in the signs for the 
coefficients of the model.  In the sequential probit model a Spanish speaking child had an 
insignificant coefficient for working in 1997.  These coefficients become significant in 
2000: small but positive for the not going to school and working case and negative for the 
going to school and working case.  The significance of the coefficients also changes for 
the multinomial logit.  While the coefficients were positive for a child to go to school and 
work and not to go to school and not to work in 1997, they became insignificant for 2000.  
There were no changes for the no school and work coefficient. 
 
  As a conclusion, age, gender and being indigenous do have a significant effect on 
schooling and work decisions under every model and support previous findings.  Girls are 
less likely to go to school or work.  A more educated head increases the probability of a 
child of going to school and decreases the probabilities of working.  A married or living 
in free union head increases the probability of a child to go to school and not work.  An 
increase in the number of children under the age of 12 decreases the probability of going 
to school and increases the probability of working in 1997 while these effects become 
insignificant in 2000. Bilingual and Spanish speaking children did not experience as 
many changes in probabilities as the indigenous children, which means that the program   24 
 
has a stronger effect in the latter group.  In all cases, there is support for the non-
exploitative scenario shown in the theoretical model. 
 
8. Conclusions 
  In the sample under analysis, child labor is higher for indigenous children. Child 
labor incidence decreased after PROGRESA/OPORTUNIDADES by 8 percent between 
1997 and 2000.  The higher effect was noticed for 15 year old indigenous children in the 
treatment group, with a 26 percent decrease in child labor incidence followed by a 25 
percent decrease for the entire treatment group.  Comparing 1997 and 2000, differences 
in child labor between the treatment and control group narrow.  Education is very similar 
for bilingual and Spanish children at all ages, but higher with respect with indigenous 
children.  This difference has decreased, especially for older age groups. 
 
  Older children are more likely to work and not attend school.  Older children are 
also more likely to be in the not working and not going to school state.  Girls are less 
likely to go to school or work.  Among the characteristics of the household head, a more 
educated head increases the probability of a child of going to school and decreases the 
probabilities of working.  Being married (or living in free union) increases the probability 
of a child to go to school and not work.  The number of children under the age of 12 had 
a negative impact on the probability of a child going to school and a positive effect on 
working, but it becomes insignificant after the start of PROGRESA.  Poverty does 
increase the probability of going to school and not working after treatment in the 
program.  Bilingual children did not experience as many changes in probabilities as the 
indigenous (monolingual) children.  Spanish speaking children did not show significant 
changes. 
 
  This analysis adds a new perspective on conditional-cash-transfer programs, while 
showing that, in the case of Mexico, the program had a robust differential impact on 
indigenous children, especially those who are bilingual.  Moreover, it is consistent with 
findings in other papers related to indigenous schooling barriers, such as Parker et al. 
(2003), where monolingual indigenous children have a higher hurdle to overcome when   25 
 
compared with those who are bilingual.  In principle, these results could also shed light 
on the causes and consequences of incorporating specific components targeted to 
indigenous people in conditional cash transfer programs in developing countries.   26 
 
Appendix 
Result 1:  The first order conditions of the household problem are 
      0 = − − + + I A I A W w s w l w c  
               0 = −λ C U  
        0 = − λ A l w U  
        0 = − λ I s w U  
We will apply the implicit function theorem. We construct a system of equations that 
represent the derivative of each row from the first order conditions with respect to the 
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 if the first term above is bigger than the 
second one. This can be expressed as: 
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Using the fact that U is concave, and the cross-partials are all positive, a sufficient 
condition for that inequality to hold is  
sl sc A U U w >    27 
 
whose interpretation is given in the text. 
Result 3: The steady state level of schooling is the particular solution to the second order 
difference equation 
() ( ) 0 1 1
2 2
1
2 = − − + + − − + k s k s k s t t t βα η η βα β ηα η  
which is given by 
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Thus  η βα > k , then  η α > k for any  β < 0.  I f   η α > k and 1 > η , both the denominator and 
the numerator are positive, so  0
* > s . 
Moreover,  () 0 0
* = − ⇔ = k s βα η but that would make the denominator also equal to 
zero, originating an indeterminacy in 
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Table 2. Child Labor by age groups 
Group 8 to 12 13 to 16  8 to 12 13 to 16 
Indigenous-
monolingual 5.6% 30.6% 1.0% 15.9%
Bilingual 3.9% 22.6% 2.3% 14.7%







Table 3. Child labor in Treatment and Control Groups 
 
1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999
Indigenous-
Monolingual 4.7% 1.1% 7.2% 0.9% 30.5% 14.8% 30.8% 18.1%
Bilingual 4.5% 2.2% 2.9% 2.5% 22.8% 14.3% 22.2% 15.1%
Spanish-Monolingual 6.5% 1.7% 3.9% 1.1% 29.3% 13.1% 24.7% 14.1%
Treatment Control







Table 4. Average years of Education 
Average years of education
1997 1999 1997 1999
Indigenous-
Monolingual 2.6 3.4 4.7 6.4
Bilingual 3.1 3.4 5.9 6.4
Spanish-Monolingual 3.3 3.4 6.0 6.5
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Table 5. Sequential Probit, 1997, Indigenous 
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
    SsNw   SsSw   NsSw 
Age  of  Child    -0.099   -0.033   0.084 
                (76.12)**         (21.61)**       (23.71)** 
Gender of Child              -0.005   -0.110            -0.392 
(Female)      (0.85)            (16.72)**        (36.08)** 
Gender of Head     0.033     0.040    0.072 
(Female)      (2.19)*   (1.99)*            (2.28)* 
Age of Head       0.002     0.000    0.001 
        (4.80)**  (0.86)             (2.01)* 
Education  of      0.021     0.007   0.004 
Head (in years)            (17.56)**  (4.65)**         (1.55) 
Marital Status of     0.067     0.030             0.019 
Head (Couple)     (4.47)**  (1.99)*           (0.70) 
Number of children              -0.010    0.009             0.021 
Aged less than 12    (5.88)**  (4.33)**        (6.00)** 
Number of children     0.002     0.008             0.020 
Between 12 and 16    (0.61)    (2.25)*           (3.00)** 
Number of Adults     0.003              -0.018           -0.008 
        (1.14)    (6.44)**         (1.86) 
Number of Elderly              -0.007   -0.002           -0.007 
(Above 60)      (1.15)    (0.32)            (0.51) 
Poor        -0.034   -0.018          -0.051 
        (5.46)**  (2.39)*          (3.95)** 
Only speaks               -0.250    -0.069          -0.185 
Indigenous language           (15.89)**  (5.98)**        (6.69)** 
Observations    31298       9380   8131 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%; SsSw= Child is in school and works; SsNw=Child is in school and does not work; 
NsSw= Child is not in school and works; NsNw= Child is not in school and does not 
work   32 
 
Table 6. Sequential Probit, 1997, Bilingual 
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
    SsNw   SsSw   NsSw 
Age of Child        -0.099    -0.032     0.087 
    (76.15)**  (21.13)**  (24.49)** 
Gender of Child     -0.006    -0.111     -0.395 
(Female)    (1.06)   (16.91)**      (36.22)** 
Gender of Head     0.040       0.045      0.079 
(Female)      (2.67)**    (2.21)*     (2.47)* 
Age of Head      0.002       0.001      0.002 
    (5.94)**    (1.40)         (2.58)** 
Education of        0.023      0.008       0.007 
Head (in years)            (19.00)**   (5.65)**     (2.54)* 
Marital Status of     0.070      0.031       0.020 
Head (Couple)     (4.69)**  (2.06)*      (0.72) 
Number of children    -0.010    0.009        0.022 
Aged less than 12    (5.53)**  (4.49)**    (6.17)** 
Number of children     0.008     0.011       0.026 
Between 12 and 16    (2.62)**          (2.84)**    (3.74)** 
Number of Adults     0.002             -0.018               -0.007 
        (0.97)             (6.43)**   (1.70) 
Number of Elderly    -0.012            -0.004              -0.009 
(Above 60)      (1.84)             (0.52)               (0.68) 
Poor        -0.053            -0.024               -0.061 
        (8.59)**         (3.06)**   (4.70)** 
Bilingual       0.090              0.020      0.038 
               (15.20)**          (2.48)*      (2.73)** 
Observations    31298   9380       8131 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%; SsSw= Child is in school and works; SsNw=Child is in school and does not work; 
NsSw= Child is not in school and works; NsNw= Child is not in school and does not 
work   33 
 
Table 7. Sequential Probit, 1997, Spanish-monolingual 
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
    SsNw   SsSw   NsSw 
Age of Child        -0.098   -0.032       0.087 
    (75.74)**  (20.97)**    (24.65)** 
Gender of Child     -0.006    -0.112     -0.394 
(Female)      (1.18)   (16.93)**    (36.15)** 
Gender of Head      0.039      0.043      0.076 
(Female)      (2.62)**   (2.12)*     (2.38)* 
Age of Head       0.002      0.000       0.002 
        (6.06)**  (1.24)                (2.40)* 
Education of       0.024     0.008       0.007 
Head (in years)            (19.78)**  (5.57)**    (2.39)* 
Marital Status      0.070     0.031       0.019 
Of Head (Couple)    (4.64)**  (2.01)*     (0.70) 
Number of children    -0.010    0.009       0.022 
Aged less than 12    (5.66)**  (4.37)**    (6.06)** 
Number of children     0.007     0.009       0.023 
Between 12 and 16    (2.14)*   (2.49)*      (3.33)** 
Number of adults     0.002    -0.018     -0.008 
    (1.01)   (6.45)**      (1.76) 
Number of elderly    -0.011             -0.003     -0.008 
(Above  60)    (1.70)   (0.44)       (0.63) 
Poor        -0.047            -0.020      -0.055 
    (7.61)**  (2.59)**      (4.20)** 
Only Speaks Spanish    -0.044    0.006       0.008 
    (7.58)**  (0.79)       (0.60) 
Observations    31298     9380         8131 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%; SsSw= Child is in school and works; SsNw=Child is in school and does not work; 
NsSw= Child is not in school and works; NsNw= Child is not in school and does not 
work 
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Table 8. Sequential Probit, 2000, Indigenous 
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
    SsNw   SsSw   NsSw 
Age of Child        -0.080  -0.003      0.057 
    (67.98)**  (4.51)**  (21.59)** 
Gender of Child     -0.025   -0.028     -0.254 
(Female)      (5.00)**  (7.94)**  (29.80)** 
Gender of Head     -0.025    0.006       0.038 
(Female)      (2.43)* (0.92)       (2.44)* 
Age of Head      -0.001    0.000       0.001 
    (2.43)*   (1.00)       (1.18) 
Education of       0.014     0.002       0.000 
Head(in years)             (12.84)**  (3.29)**    (0.14) 
Marital Status of     0.031             -0.005        0.002 
Head  (Couple)    (3.62)**          (0.89)      (0.14) 
Number of children    -0.008            -0.001      -0.001 
Aged less than 12    (6.04)**          (1.51)                (0.68) 
Number of children     0.004     0.001     -0.008 
Between 12 and 16    (1.58)             (0.60)               (1.73) 
Number of Adults             -0.010            -0.001    -0.006 
        (6.05)**         (0.61)              (2.56)* 
Number of Elderly    -0.033           -0.008    -0.021 
(Above 60)      (6.67)**         (2.22)*    (2.67)** 
Poor     0.024   0.003     0.023 
        (4.12)**         (0.89)    (2.76)** 
Only  speaks    0.033   0.009   -0.049 
Indigenous language             (2.49)*            (0.94)              (2.55)* 
Observations    29891   7878   7668 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%; SsSw= Child is in school and works; SsNw=Child is in school and does not work; 
NsSw= Child is not in school and works; NsNw= Child is not in school and does not 
work   35 
 
Table 9. Sequential Probit, 2000, Bilingual 
             (1)       (2)         (3) 
      SsNw     SsSw         NsSw 
Age of Child        -0.080  -0.003       0.057 
      (68.04)**  (4.43)**    (21.53)** 
Gender of Child      -0.025  -0.028      -0.253 
(Female)        (5.01)**  (7.97)**   (29.74)** 
Gender of Head      -0.021   0.007        0.034 
(Female)        (2.02)*  (1.12)       (2.22)* 
Age of Head       -0.001    0.000        0.000 
         (2.06)*  (1.16)        (0.96) 
Education of        0.013    0.002        0.001 
Head(in years)              (12.34)**  (3.11)**     (0.43) 
Marital Status of      0.031   -0.004       0.001 
Head  (Couple)     (3.68)**  (0.84)        (0.09) 
Number of children    -0.008   -0.001      -0.001 
Aged less than 12     (6.01)**  (1.44)        (0.68) 
Number of children      0.006   0.001      -0.008 
Between 12 and 16    (1.95)             (0.68)                (1.79) 
Number of Adults    -0.010            -0.001      -0.006 
        (6.17)**          (0.58)      (2.55)* 
Number of Elderly    -0.035            -0.008      -0.020 
(Above 60)      (7.06)**          (2.32)*     (2.54)* 
Poor       0.020   0.002         0.026 
        (3.32)**         (0.57)      (3.00)** 
Bilingual        0.038              0.008      -0.022 
        (7.01)**         (2.38)*     (2.62)** 
Observations    29891   7878         7668 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%; SsSw=Child is in school and works; SsNw=Child is in school and does not work; 
NsSw=Child is not in school and works; NsNw=Child is not in school and does not work   36 
 
Table 10. Sequential Probit, 2000, Spanish-monolingual 
               (1)          (2)          (3) 
            SsNw      SsSw       NsSw 
Age of Child          -0.080    -0.003       0.057 
          (68.06)**    (4.45)**    (21.54)** 
Gender of Child       -0.025    -0.028     -0.253 
(Female)         (5.00)**    (7.97)**   (29.71)** 
Gender of Head       -0.021     0.007      0.034 
(Female)         (2.04)*    (1.10)                (2.18)* 
Age of Head         -0.001     0.000      0.000 
           (2.23)*    (1.10)         (0.94) 
Education of          0.014     0.002      0.001 
Head(in years)       (12.61)**    (3.20)**     (0.29) 
Marital Status of        0.032    -0.004      0.001 
Head  (Couple)       (3.73)**    (0.84)       (0.05) 
Number of children       -0.008    -0.001     -0.001 
Aged less than 12      (5.99)**    (1.43)      (0.71) 
Number of children       0.006     0.001     -0.009 
Between 12 and 16      (2.07)*    (0.72)      (1.93) 
Number of Adults       -0.010   -0.001      -0.007 
           (6.05)**   (0.55)      (2.66)** 
Number of Elderly      -0.035    -0.008    -0.020 
(Above 60)         (7.06)**    (2.31)*     (2.52)* 
Poor            0.018     0.002    0.028 
           (3.01)**    (0.46)      (3.26)** 
Only speaks         -0.041    -0.009      0.032 
Spanish-monolingual      (7.77)**    (2.57)*     (3.84)** 
Observations         29891    7878        7668 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%; SsSw=Child is in school and works; SsNw=Child is in school and does not work; 
NsSw=Child is not in school and works; NsNw=Child is not in school and does not work   37 
 
Table 11. Multinomial Logit, Indigenous, 1997 
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
    SsSw   NsSw   NsNw 
Age  of  Child    0.268   0.957   0.652 
    (18.51)**  (55.77)**  (57.01)** 
Gender  of  Child   -0.966   -1.016   1.065 
(Female)    (14.58)**  (19.33)**  (25.21)** 
Gender  of  Head   0.097   -0.068   -0.294 
(Female)    (0.56)   (0.50)   (2.49)* 
Age  of  Head    -0.006   -0.006   -0.008 
    (1.64)   (1.87)   (3.10)** 
Education  of    -0.061   -0.136   -0.109 
Head (in years)    (4.57)**  (11.71)**  (11.56)** 
Marital  Status  of   -0.085   -0.370   -0.276 
Head  (Couple)    (0.53)   (3.00)**  (2.61)** 
Number  of  children   0.146   0.119   0.003 
Aged less than 12    (7.53)**  (7.52)**  (0.26) 
Number  of  children   0.063   0.079   -0.009 
Between 12 and 16    (1.87)    (2.62)**  (0.37) 
Number  of  Adults   -0.182   -0.018   0.046 
    (6.50)**  (0.95)   (2.90)** 
Number  of  Elderly   0.021   0.004   -0.018 
(Above  60)    (0.29)   (0.07)   (0.37) 
Poor     0.030   0.033   0.292 
    (0.42)   (0.60)   (6.30)** 
Only  speaks    0.364   0.051   0.163 
Indigenous  language   (2.20)*   (0.26)   (1.17) 
Constant    -5.215   -13.876 -10.045 
    (17.12)**  (44.48)**  (44.53)** 
Observations    29928   29928   29928 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%; SsNw=comparison group; SsSw= Child is in school and works; SsNw=Child is in 
school and does not work; NsSw= Child is not in school and works; NsNw= Child is not 
in school and does not work 
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Table 12. Multinomial Logit, Bilingual, 1997 
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
    SsSw   NsSw   NsNw 
Age  of  Child    0.275   0.971   0.665 
    (18.83)**  (56.12)**  (57.44)** 
Gender  of  Child   -0.967   -1.021   1.062 
(Female)    (14.59)**  (19.36)**  (25.04)** 
Gender  of  Head   0.075   -0.090   -0.316 
(Female)    (0.44)   (0.67)   (2.68)** 
Age  of  Head    -0.006   -0.006   -0.008 
    (1.75)   (2.02)*   (3.31)** 
Education  of    -0.060   -0.132   -0.105 
Head (in years)    (4.50)**  (11.35)**  (11.14)** 
Marital  Status  of   -0.100   -0.386   -0.284 
Head  (Couple)    (0.62)   (3.12)**  (2.68)** 
Number  of  children   0.145   0.118   0.000 
Aged less than 12    (7.45)**  (7.45)**  (0.02) 
Number  of  children   0.048   0.052   -0.037 
Between 12 and 16    (1.42)    (1.70)    (1.53) 
Number  of  Adults   -0.179   -0.019   0.047 
    (6.40)**  (0.98)   (2.93)** 
Number  of  Elderly   0.034   0.017   -0.002 
(Above  60)    (0.48)   (0.29)   (0.05) 
Poor     0.092   0.116   0.385 
    (1.28)   (2.08)*   (8.17)** 
Bilingual    -0.384   -0.565   -0.600 
    (5.38)**  (9.81)**  (12.40)** 
Constant    -5.180   -13.888 -10.044 
    (17.06)**  (44.55)**  (44.51)** 
Observations    29928   29928   29928 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%; SsNw=comparison group; SsSw= Child is in school and works; SsNw=Child is in 
school and does not work; NsSw=Child is not in school and works; NsNw=Child is not in 
school and does not work 
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Table 13. Multinomial Logit, Spanish-monolingual, 1997 
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
    SsSw   NsSw   NsNw 
Age  of  Child    0.272   0.968   0.662 
    (18.68)**  (56.07)**  (57.32)** 
Gender  of  Child   -0.965   -1.022   1.062 
(Female)    (14.57)**  (19.37)**  (25.06)** 
Gender  of  Head   0.073   -0.095   -0.320 
(Female)    (0.43)   (0.70)   (2.71)** 
Age  of  Head    -0.007   -0.006   -0.009 
    (1.82)   (2.14)*   (3.49)** 
Education  of    -0.063   -0.136   -0.109 
Head (in years)    (4.73)**  (11.63)**  (11.56)** 
Marital  Status  of   -0.098   -0.387   -0.284 
Head  (Couple)    (0.61)   (3.13)**  (2.68)** 
Number  of  children   0.145   0.118   0.000 
Aged less than 12    (7.45)**  (7.43)**  (0.00) 
Number  of  children   0.049   0.049   -0.040 
Between 12 and 16    (1.45)    (1.61)    (1.64) 
Number  of  Adults   -0.178   -0.018   0.047 
    (6.38)**  (0.95)   (2.96)** 
Number  of  Elderly   0.032   0.017   -0.003 
(Above  60)    (0.45)   (0.29)   (0.06) 
Poor     0.085   0.119   0.385 
    (1.18)   (2.13)*   (8.18)** 
Only  speaks    0.292   0.541   0.553 
Spanish-monolingual    (4.32)** (9.62)** (11.83)** 
Constant    -5.429   -14.361 -10.522 
    (17.51)**  (45.30)**  (45.65)** 
Observations    29928   29928   29928 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%; SsNw=comparison group; SsSw=Child is in school and works; SsNw=Child is in 
school and does not work; NsSw=Child is not in school and works; NsNw=Child is not in 
school and does not work   40 
 
Table 14. Multinomial Logit, Indigenous, 2000 
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
    SsSw   NsSw   NsNw 
Age  of  Child    0.365   1.067   0.613 
    (10.38)**  (40.95)**  (6.96)** 
Gender  of  Child   -1.060   -1.431   0.577 
(Female)    (6.54)**  (18.61)**  (1.79) 
Gender of Head     0.327    0.294    0.188 
(Female)    (1.31)   (2.35)*   (0.30) 
Age  of  Head    0.009   -0.000   -0.016 
    (1.07)   (0.08)   (0.90) 
Education  of    0.005   -0.116   -0.260 
Head (in years)    (0.17)    (7.99)**  (2.96)** 
Marital  Status  of   -0.460   -0.166   0.035 
Head  (Couple)   (2.13)*   (1.59)   (0.07) 
Number  of  children   -0.001   0.051   0.212 
Aged less than 12    (0.04)    (3.05)**  (3.17)** 
Number  of  children   0.051   0.048   -0.042 
Between 12 and 16    (0.63)    (1.19)    (0.22) 
Number  of  Adults   0.031   -0.027   -0.069 
    (0.66)   (1.25)   (0.59) 
Number  of  Elderly   -0.151   -0.047   -0.030 
(Above  60)    (0.97)   (0.68)   (0.09) 
Poor     0.056   -0.009   0.559 
    (0.35)   (0.12)   (1.21) 
Only  speaks    0.112   -0.615   0.762 
Indigenous  language   (0.32)   (3.12)**  (1.40) 
Constant    -8.991   -16.452 -14.077 
    (13.96)**  (37.71)**  (8.84)** 
Observations    23752   23752   23752 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%; SsNw=comparison group; SsSw=Child is in school and works; SsNw=Child is in 
school and does not work; NsSw=Child is not in school and works; NsNw=Child is not in 
school and does not work   41 
 
Table 15. Multinomial Logit, Bilingual, 2000 
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
    SsSw   SsNw   NsNw 
Age  of  Child    0.364   1.079   0.633 
    (10.34)**  (41.05)**  (7.08)** 
Gender  of  Child   -1.060   -1.436   0.544 
(Female)    (6.54)**  (18.59)**  (1.69) 
Gender  of  Head   0.334   0.235   0.113 
(Female)    (1.34)   (1.87)   (0.18) 
Age  of  Head    0.009   -0.002   -0.017 
    (1.11)   (0.64)   (0.91) 
Education  of    0.003   -0.106   -0.273 
Head(in  years)    (0.11)   (7.27)**  (3.05)** 
Marital  Status  of   -0.460   -0.183   0.020 
Head  (Couple)   (2.13)*   (1.75)   (0.04) 
Number  of  children   -0.001   0.052   0.216 
Aged less than 12    (0.03)    (3.15)**  (3.24)** 
Number  of  children   0.053   0.022   -0.100 
Between 12 and 16    (0.65)    (0.54)    (0.53) 
Number  of  Adults   0.031   -0.026   -0.075 
    (0.65)   (1.17)   (0.65) 
Number  of  Elderly   -0.154   -0.016   0.032 
(Above  60)    (0.99)   (0.24)   (0.09) 
Poor     0.049   0.071   0.724 
    (0.30)   (0.94)   (1.56) 
Bilingual    0.064   -0.646   -0.970 
    (0.44)   (8.73)**  (2.42)* 
Constant    -9.006   -16.360 -13.975 
    (13.97)**  (37.40)**  (8.82)** 
Observations    23752   23752   23752 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%; SsNw=comparison group; SsSw=Child is in school and works; SsNw=Child is in 
school and does not work; NsSw=Child is not in school and works; NsNw=Child is not in 
school and does not work   42 
 
Table 16. Multinomial Logit, Spanish-monolingual, 2000 
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
    SsSw   NsSw   NsNw 
Age  of  Child    0.364   1.082   0.626 
    (10.34)**  (41.04)**  (7.04)** 
Gender  of  Child   -1.059   -1.447   0.539 
(Female)    (6.53)**  (18.68)**  (1.67) 
Gender  of  Head   0.333   0.234   0.137 
(Female)    (1.33)   (1.86)   (0.22) 
Age  of  Head    0.009   -0.002   -0.015 
    (1.10)   (0.48)   (0.82) 
Education  of    0.004   -0.112   -0.278 
Head(in  years)    (0.13)   (7.61)**  (3.12)** 
Marital  Status  of   -0.459   -0.198   0.011 
Head  (Couple)   (2.12)*   (1.88)   (0.02) 
Number  of  children   -0.001   0.054   0.214 
Aged less than 12    (0.03)    (3.24)**  (3.23)** 
Number  of  children   0.054   0.013   -0.089 
Between 12 and 16    (0.66)    (0.31)    (0.47) 
Number  of  Adults   0.031   -0.030   -0.079 
    (0.65)   (1.36)   (0.68) 
Number  of  Elderly   -0.154   -0.015   0.007 
(Above  60)    (0.99)   (0.22)   (0.02) 
Poor     0.047   0.098   0.708 
    (0.29)   (1.31)   (1.52) 
Only  speaks    -0.064   0.716   0.642 
Spanish-monolingual   (0.44)   (9.92)**  (1.83) 
Constant    -8.942   -17.072 -14.629 
    (13.64)**  (38.32)**  (9.05)** 
Observations    23752   23752   23752 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%; SsNw=comparison group; SsSw=Child is in school and works; SsNw=Child is in 
school and does not work; NsSw=Child is not in school and works; NsNw=Child is not in 
school and does not work 
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Figure 1. Child labor by age groups 
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Figure 2. Average years of education 
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Figure 3. Average years of education 
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